Publications

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“Ranking and Search Effort in Matching”, with Hanna Wang, 2021 Sep 18, Economic Theory (2021)

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This is a joint work with my Ph.D. classmate. The paper studies the workers’ search effort when they are ranked by a common observable trait (e.g., test scores, college). We fully characterize the equilibrium to show how the search effort varies with rank, and how the market tightness and search cost affect a worker’s match outcome.

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 “Optimal aggregation of multiple signals: Optimality of linear aggregation rule and possibility of using the maximum or the minimum of signals”, with Sam-Ho Lee, 2014 Jan 1, Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, 25, 4, p. 71-81 Download Paper

An optimal aggregation rule of multiple signals is studied. A sufficient condition for the optimality of a linear aggregation rule (the weighted sum of signals) and the common classes of signal distributions satisfying the condition are provided. Other aggregation rules such as rules using the maximum or the minimum are also considered and their usefulness is illustrated through examples.

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Research Paper(s) in Progress

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“Competition in Matching Market with Search Frictions: A Steady-State Analysis” 

The goal of this project is to understand incentives to search when agents’ heterogeneity matter through acceptance rule/switching strategy of the counterparty. I employ continuous-time random search framework to analyze the equilibrium behavior in steady state. I show that agent’s search intensity is increasing in his/her acceptance rate, and the expected duration of the match. Policies that make firing costly is shown to have dubious effects. I also characterize a sufficient condition for existence of steady state.

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“Patent Race, Optimal Licensing Fee and Patent Duration”, with Ryan Fackler

The basic goal of this project is to get insight into the following questions: (1) How does industry characteristics (invention arrival rate and invention value) change incentives to license a patent and to conduct ongoing research? (2) How does the length of the patent impact incentives to license a patent and to conduct ongoing research? (3) How does the socially optimal patent term length change with industry characteristics? To get insight into these three questions, we are going to consider a two-firm model. One firm will have a patent while the other does not. The firm with a patent must decide how much to produce using their patent, whether they want to do research to get a new patent, and how much they should charge as a licensing fee to the other firm. The firm without the patent must decide how much to produce given the licensing fee, and whether to do research to get their own patent.

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