Joonbae Lee

Ph.D Candidate
University of Pennsylvania

Go to school webpage

Research Interests:

Applied Microeconomic Theory, Labor Economics

Job Market Candidate Status:

I will be available for interviews at the European Job Market, on December 6-7 2018, in Naples, Italy, and at the 2019 ASSA annual meetings in Atlanta on January 4-6.

Email:                                   LinkedIn page:

joonbae@sas.upenn.edu

Address:

Department of Economics
University of Pennsylvania
The Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics
133 South 36th St. Philadelphia, PA19104-6297

  • LinkedIn - Grey Circle

Welcome! I'm Joonbae Lee.

 

Welcome to my webpage. I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania. My interests lie between the applied economic theory and labor economics focusing on search-and-match models in labor market context. Current research focuses on Bayesian learning about worker’s quality in dynamic environment, and the effect of truncated public information on a worker’s wage growth.

I will be available for interviews at the European Job Market, on December 6-7 2018, in Naples, Italy, and at the 2019 ASSA annual meetings in Atlanta on January 4-6.

EDUCATION
 
2013-Current

Ph.D Candidate

University of Pennsylvania

Thesis Title:

“Essays on Labor Market with Search and Information Frictions”

Expected Completion Date: May 2019

2011-2013

Master's Degree

Korea University, Seoul, South Korea

M.A., Economics, 2013

2004-2011

Bachelor's Degree

Korea University, Seoul, South Korea

B.A., Economics, 2011

B.S., Mathematics, 2011

(Military service in Korea, 2 yrs )

 
RESEARCH & TEACHING INTEREST FIELD

Applied Microeconomic Theory

Labor Economics 

RESEARCH
“Wage Dynamics with Developing Asymmetric Information” (Job Market Paper)
  Download Paper

This paper introduces asymmetric information into the benchmark on-the-job search models of the labor market such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). To capture this idea, I assume that workers are heterogeneous in productivity, while firms learn about the productivity of their current workers over time. When a poaching firm contacts an employed worker, it is possible that the incumbent firm knows the worker's type, while the poaching firm does not. This introduces asymmetry of information when a poaching firm and incumbent firm plays first price auction game as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). When incumbent firm is more informed than poaching firm, I find that poaching firm's belief about a worker's type increases with tenure, and that job-to-job transitions convey negative information on worker's type. At the same time, high type workers change jobs less frequently, while low type workers change jobs more frequently. This result matches the data, while more job transitions lead to higher wage in on-the-job search models with perfect information. The model also has implications to information policies in labor market, such as banning employers from inquiring applicant's wage history. The model implies that the policy decreases wage dispersion between types, but might have an unintended consequence of increasing adverse selection, and slowing down workers' wage growth.

“Ranking and Search Effort in Matching”, with Hanna Wang, (Submitted)
  Download Paper

This paper studies the relationship between search effort and workers' ranking by employers. We propose a matching model in which employers' common preferences over a continuum of heterogeneous workers affect the number of applications each worker sends out. We show that in equilibrium, the relationship is hump-shaped if there are sufficiently large number of workers relative to vacancies: that is, highly-ranked and lowly-ranked workers send out fewer applications than workers of mid-range rank. This arises due to two opposing forces driving the incentive of applicants. Increasing the number of applications acts as insurance against unemployment but is less effective when the probability of success for each application is low. This mechanism exacerbates the negative employment outcomes of low-rank workers. We discuss comparative statics with regards to the size of the vacancy pool and application cost, and show that, in contrast to the market equilibrium, planner's solution exhibits the number of applications monotonously decreasing in rank.

Publications
 “Optimal aggregation of multiple signals: Optimality of linear aggregation rule and possibility of using the maximum or the minimum of signals”, with Sam-Ho Lee, 2014 Jan 1, Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, 25, 4, p. 71-81 Download Paper

An optimal aggregation rule of multiple signals is studied. A sufficient condition for the optimality of a linear aggregation rule (the weighted sum of signals) and the common classes of signal distributions satisfying the condition are provided. Other aggregation rules such as rules using the maximum or the minimum are also considered and their usefulness is illustrated through examples.

Research Paper(s) in Progress
“Competition in Matching Market with Search Frictions: A Steady-State Analysis” 

The goal of this project is to understand incentives to search when agents’ heterogeneity matter through acceptance rule/switching strategy of the counterparty. I employ continuous-time random search framework to analyze the equilibrium behavior in steady state. I show that agent’s search intensity is increasing in his/her acceptance rate, and the expected duration of the match. Policies that make firing costly is shown to have dubious effects. I also characterize a sufficient condition for existence of steady state.

“Patent Race, Optimal Licensing Fee and Patent Duration”, with Ryan Fackler

The basic goal of this project is to get insight into the following questions: (1) How does industry characteristics (invention arrival rate and invention value) change incentives to license a patent and to conduct ongoing research? (2) How does the length of the patent impact incentives to license a patent and to conduct ongoing research? (3) How does the socially optimal patent term length change with industry characteristics? To get insight into these three questions, we are going to consider a two-firm model. One firm will have a patent while the other does not. The firm with a patent must decide how much to produce using their patent, whether they want to do research to get a new patent, and how much they should charge as a licensing fee to the other firm. The firm without the patent must decide how much to produce given the licensing fee, and whether to do research to get their own patent.

 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Graduate level courses at University of Pennsylvania
Fall,2018

Teaching Assistant

Economics for Social Policy (Masters Level)

School of Social Policy and Practice

for Prof. Ioana Marinescu

Summer, 2016

Instructor

Summer, 2016

Instructor

Math Camp for Incoming Graduate Students

Dept. of Economics

Fall, 2015

Teaching Assistant

Graduate Game Theory

Dept. of Economics

for Prof. George Mailath and Prof. Mallesh Pai

Fall, 2014

Teaching Assistant

Graduate Game Theory

Dept. of Economics

for Prof. George Mailath and Prof. Mallesh Pai

Undergraduate level courses at University of Pennsylvania
Summer,2018

Instructor

Statistics for Economists

Dept. of Economics

Spring, 2018

Recitation Instructor

Fall, 2017

Teaching Assistant

Spring, 2015

Teaching Assistant

Intermediate Microeconomics

Dept. of Economics

for Prof. Kenneth Burdett

Strategic Reasoning Philosophy

Politics and Economics Program

for Prof. Deniz Selman

Strategic Reasoning Philosophy

Politics and Economics Program

for Prof. David Dillenberger

© 2018 created by Joonbae Lee

This site was designed with the
.com
website builder. Create your website today.
Start Now